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Abstract 
Some people think that the inevitability of human extinction renders life meaningless. Joshua 
Seachris has argued that naturalism can be conceptualized as a meta-narrative and that it narrates 
across important questions of human life, including what is the meaning of life and how life will 
end. How a narrative ends is important, Seachris argues. In the absence of God, and with knowledge 
that human extinction is a certainty, is there any way that humanity could be meaningful and have a 
good ending? I  will distinguish between two conceptions of how humanity could be meaningful: 
the traditional view and an alternative view, which I will outline. I will argue that this alternative 
view provides a plausible explanation for how humanity could become meaningful. I will also argue 
that coming to terms with our mortality and other limitations would add meaning to human life and 
provide humanity with a good ending.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Of all the species that have ever existed, an estimated 99.9% of them are 
now extinct.1 Humanity will also someday cease to exist. Some theists have 
argued that human life is meaningless without God and personal immortality. 
Humanity would be on a “purposeless rush toward oblivion,” William Lane 
Craig writes.2  
Joshua Seachris attempts to explain why some people reach this bleak 
conclusion. He begins by arguing that entire metaphysical systems, including 
naturalism, can be conceptualized as narratives or meta-narratives.3 A narrative 
consists of a story (an event or sequence of events) and narrative discourse (the 
representation of those events).4 A meta-narrative (e.g., Christian theism) is a 
global story that encompasses and explains smaller stories.   
Jean-François Lyotard famously defined “postmodern” as “incredulity 
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1 Raup (1991), p. 4.  
2 Craig (2000), p. 45.  
3 Seachris (2011), p. 142.   
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toward metanarratives.”5 The meta-narratives are in crisis and losing their 
functions, heroes, and great goals, he indicated.  
Despite this skepticism from Lyotard and others, Seachris maintains that 
there are meta-narratives, including Christian theism and naturalism. He claims 
that naturalism narrates across important existential questions of human life, 
including how life began, what is the meaning of life, and how life will end.6 
How a narrative ends is important, Seachris argues. As support for this claim, he 
quotes J. David Velleman who writes: “the conclusory emotion in a narrative 
cadence embodies not just how the audience feels about the ending; it embodies 
how the audience feels, at the ending, about the whole story.”7  
Seachris contends that the “last word” on the naturalistic meta-narrative is 
death and complete dissolution.8 This explains, he argues, why many people 
“have difficulty shaking conclusions of cosmic futility and 
meaninglessness . . . .”9 By “complete dissolution,” Seachris means that when 
humanity ends “it will be as if none of this ever happened,” in the sense that 
what did happen was not meaningful.10  
Throughout history, many people have become distressed in thinking about 
human extinction, including individuals who do not conceive of naturalism 
narratively. Therefore, it is important to respond to the concerns discussed by 
Seachris, even if one has doubts that naturalism is a meta-narrative. In this paper, 
I will assume that naturalism is a meta-narrative. 
I will be addressing the following two questions. First, in the absence of God, 
and with knowledge that human extinction is a certainty, is there any way that 
human life in general could be meaningful? Second, is there any way that 
humanity could have a good ending?11   
I will first provide a brief overview of “meaning in life” and “meaning of 
life.” In section three, I will discuss three different senses of “ending.” In section 
four, I will attempt to make some progress in clarifying the obscure question 
“What is the meaning of life?” I will do so by distinguishing between two ways 
                                                     
5 Lyotard (1984), p. xxiv. 
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of thinking about how humanity could be meaningful. With the traditional view, 
a meaning of life is thought to be something bestowed on humanity, as a group, 
by a deity. This view raises many difficult questions, as I will explain, and is 
doubtful. There is, however, an alternative way that humanity could become 
meaningful. By engaging with inherently valuable and natural goods, it adds 
meaning to our individual lives which, in turn, adds meaning to humanity from 
the “bottom-up.” As more individual lives become meaningful, there is a 
corresponding increase in the meaning of human life.  I will argue that this 
latter view provides a plausible explanation for how humanity could become 
meaningful.  
The things that we create, and the knowledge we attain, will someday vanish. 
For this reason, some theists and pessimists argue that life is ultimately 
meaningless. As I will seek to demonstrate in section five, it is unnecessary for 
our works to last forever. In the sixth section, I will explain “narrative closure” 
and will argue that coming to terms with our mortality and other limitations 
would provide the naturalistic meta-narrative with this type of closure. 
 
2. Meaning in Life and Meaning of Life 
 
During the last two decades, philosophers have made progress in explaining 
what gives meaning to the life of an individual human being. Most of the recent 
theories of meaning support objective naturalism – the belief that one accrues 
meaning in one’s life by engaging with inherently valuable and entirely natural, 
mind-independent goods. Susan Wolf12 contends that actively and lovingly 
engaging in projects of worth is what gives meaning to one’s life. According to 
this subjective-objective hybrid theory, “Meaning arises when subjective 
attraction meets objective attractiveness.”13  
Thaddeus Metz14 disputes that subjective attraction is necessary for a person 
to accrue meaning. With his “fundamentality theory,” he argues that one’s life 
will accrue more meaning, the more that one contours one’s rational self, in a 
substantial way, toward fundamental conditions of human existence. 
“Fundamental conditions,” Metz indicates, are those conditions that are 
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responsible for many other conditions in a given domain. For example, in 
regards to how moral achievement can give meaning to one’s life, Metz 
indicates that “freeing people from discrimination and tyranny and providing 
them urgent medical assistance are forms of positively orienting one’s rationality 
toward conditions of a characteristic human being’s life that are responsible for 
much else about her life . . . .”15 These conditions would include, for example, 
the ability of the person to continue to make autonomous decisions. 
In their theories about “meaning in life,” Wolf and Metz do not seek to 
address questions about meaning of life. “Meaning of life” is undoubtedly one 
of the best known, but most obscure phrases in the English language. There has 
been a longstanding skepticism towards this phrase. For example, in 1947, A. J. 
Ayer indicated that we know what it is for a person to have a purpose, “But how 
can life in general be said to have any meaning?”16 Philosophers have been 
reluctant to engage with this topic, which is unfortunate. Many people want to 
know not just whether their own life can be meaningful, but whether they are a 
part of something larger than themselves that is or could be meaningful. The 
types of questions that interest them include “What is the meaning of life?” and 
“Why do we exist?”  
People who seek answers to these questions tend to view life from the 
perspective of sub specie aeternitatis. From this broad, external perspective, 
they wonder how life originated. In addition, because they see that humanity 
will end, they wonder whether our efforts will add up to anything of significance. 
From this vantage point, they also see that some of the desires that many people 
have, such as the desire for personal immortality, are unattainable. Consequently, 
they may wonder whether their efforts are ultimately futile.  
A few philosophers, including Seachris, have sought to address the questions 
about meaning of life from a theistic perspective.17 However, many people no 
longer believe in the existence of God. Therefore, it is important to begin to 
explore these larger questions about meaning of life from the perspective of 
naturalism. Before I do so, it will be useful to discuss three different conceptions 
of “ending,” as explained by Seachris, and to challenge one of his claims.   
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3. “Ending” and its Three Meanings 
 
Seachris indicates that there can be ending as termination, ending as telos, 
and ending as closure.18 Statements such as “the race has finished” connote the 
first sense of ending. The second sense of ending reflects the notion of final 
causality or purpose. Closure, the third sense of ending, occurs when there is a 
resolution to the primary conflicts of the narrative.19 
Seachris indicates that an example of telos is “the end of creation is to 
glorify God.”20 Although the Christian meta-narrative is unending, it does 
provide closure to life “under the sun,” Seachris argues. Pain and sorrow are 
permanently eradicated in the new heavens and new earth.21 Thus, Seachris 
contends that the Christian meta-narrative provides telos and closure. In contrast, 
he suggests that the naturalistic meta-narrative terminates in death and 
dissolution without providing telos or closure.22   
A principal reason that an ending is important, Seachris asserts, is because 
knowing how the narrative will end has a retroactive power insofar as it 
encroaches in our lives today and impacts how we currently appraise our lives. 
Knowing that we face a bad ending can make our lives less joyful than they 
would have been if a bad ending were not looming on the horizon, Seachris 
argues. He uses the example discussed below as support for this argument.    
Seachris asks that you imagine that you are currently dating someone and 
that this relationship will end badly in the future. He argues that if you know in 
advance that your relationship will end badly the “joy experienced will be 
mitigated by knowledge of the coming dissolution.”23 I agree with Seachris that 
the couple in this example would likely experience a reduced amount of joy. 
However, this example is not analogous to our having knowledge that humanity 
will go extinct. Although we know humanity will end, we do not know that 
humanity will end badly. Humanity could end in a good way, as I will explain in 
this paper.  
Theists and pessimists have many concerns with naturalism. They are 
                                                     
18 Seachris (2011), p. 148. 
19 For an introduction to the concept of narrative closure, see Abbott (2002), pp. 54-57 and Carroll 
(2007), pp. 1-15. 
20 Seachris (2011), p. 148. 
21 Ibid., p. 150. 
22 Ibid., pp. 146, 149, 155-156.  
23 Ibid., p. 146. 
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concerned that life originated by chance24 and that life is meaningless and is not 
significant.25 They are concerned that “we know so little about the vast universe 
we inhabit,”26 as Seachris indicates, and that there is suffering and injustice. 
They are also concerned that human beings die and that our works will not last. 
In summary, they are concerned, as Seachris indicates, that there is a 
“discrepancy between our deepest desires and the nature of the naturalistic 
world which seems to ultimately prevent these desires from being realized.”27  
The conflicts that pervade the naturalistic meta-narrative reflect our attempt 
to come to terms with our finitude, other limitations, and the imperfections of 
ourselves, and the world in which we exist.28 When people had faith in God, we 
could appeal to God to help us resolve these conflicts by, for example, fulfilling 
our desires for justice and unending life. But with the death of God (to 
paraphrase Nietzsche29), we alone are faced with resolving these conflicts. Many 
of our “deepest desires” will continue to be unrealizable in this universe. 
Fortunately, however, there is another way of resolving these conflicts to attain 
narrative closure, as will be explained in section six.  
Seachris argues that narrative closure provides a “settled stance” from which 
one can appraise human life.30 Thus, we can imagine that we are at the end of 
the narrative and assess whether human beings were able to resolve the conflicts 
that pervaded the narrative. Does telos also provide a settled stance? Telos can 
be divided into the following three phases: goal adoption, striving, and 
achievement. The first two phases of telos do not provide a settled stance from 
which one can evaluate whether human life is meaningful. However, 
achievement - the last phase of telos - does provide a settled stance. Thus, from 
the end-of-narrative perspective, we can assess whether human beings 
accomplished anything remarkable during the history of humankind. In 
summary, narrative closure and achievement provide two settled stances from 
which to appraise human life.  
Philosophers have recognized that achievements are an important source of 
                                                     
24 For a response, see Trisel (2012b) and Metz (2013), pp. 83-84. 
25 In response to this latter concern, Kahane (2014) argues that humanity would be of great cosmic 
significance if there is no sentient life elsewhere in the universe.  
26 Ibid., p. 149. 
27 Ibid., p. 154. 
28 See also Tabensky (2009), p. 53. Although Tabensky does not appear to conceive of naturalism as a 
meta-narrative, he indicates that life is largely about coming to terms with our finitude and flaws.  
29 Nietzsche (1974), pp. 181, 279-280. 
30 Seachris (2011), p. 149. 
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meaning in our individual lives.31 What is an achievement?  Do our individual 
achievements also give meaning to humanity? In the next section, I will address 
these questions.  
 
4. Meaning of Life From the “Bottom-Up” 
 
Albert Einstein, Nelson Mandela, and Charles Darwin are some of the 
individuals mentioned by Metz32 as examples of meaningful lives. There is 
something all of these individuals had in common: They made great 
achievements. I am not suggesting that achievements are the only thing that 
gives meaning to our lives. There is, however, a strong connection between 
achievements and meaning.  
What is an achievement? An achievement, Gwen Bradford33 argues, is a 
process with a certain structure that culminates in a product. Washing one’s car 
is an achievement, but it is not the type of achievement that would add meaning 
to one’s life. Bradford seeks to explain the underlying features of great 
achievements. One feature of great achievements is that they are difficult to 
make.34 To be counted as an achievement, not only must the process cause the 
product, the process must be non-accidental.35 Thus, great achievements do not 
happen by accident. They involve the exercise of rationality by agents.  
Bradford contends that there are individual and group achievements. A group 
is a collection of individuals, which raises metaphysical questions about the 
relation between individuals and the group. There is a large body of literature 
debating two questions about groups. First, can groups hold rights? Second, can 
groups be collectively responsible and blameworthy for harm that has occurred? 
For example, one question that has been debated is whether the people of 
Germany are collectively responsible for the Holocaust.36 Some philosophers 
are skeptical that groups can have rights and be collectively responsible. For 
instance, Jan Narveson indicates that only individuals can “literally engage in 
reasoning and deliberation . . . ”37 and be bearers of responsibility.38  
                                                     
31 See James (2005), pp. 429-442, Kauppinen (2012), pp. 345-377, and Bradford (2015).  
32 Metz (2013), p. 2. 
33 Bradford (2015), p. 11. 
34 James (2005), pp. 437-440 and Bradford (2015), pp. 12, 26-63. 
35 Bradford (2015), pp. 14-17, 64-82. 
36 See Rescher (1998), p. 51 and Narveson (2002), p. 188.   
37 Narveson, (1991), p. 334. 
38 Narveson (2002), p. 179. 
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In contrast to the above two questions about groups, there has been very 
little discussion about group achievements. Can a group make an achievement? 
If so, is the group achievement equal to the sum of the achievements from the 
individual members of the group or is the group achievement something “over 
and above” the individual contributions? In addressing the question of how to 
apportion the value of a group achievement among the individuals in the group, 
Nicholas Rescher advocates for the latter view. 39  He argues that the 
“collaboration synergy of people working together is something superior to the 
mere compilation of their separate achievements.”40  
A magnificent achievement occurred in 1969 when astronauts were rocketed 
to space and then, a few days later, triumphantly stepped foot on the moon. Who 
made this achievement? Was this an achievement only by the individuals who 
worked for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) or was 
this also an achievement by NASA? Those who doubt the ontological status41 of 
groups will deny that NASA made an achievement. Other scholars will 
acknowledge that NASA made an achievement but will disagree about how to 
explain this achievement. Methodological holists will maintain that this 
achievement is greater than the sum of the individual achievements by the 
astronauts and engineers, but proponents of methodological individualism will 
deny this. They will seek to explain this achievement solely in terms of the 
individual achievements of the astronauts and engineers.42 
The holism-individualism debate is relevant to, and can help clarify, the 
question about whether humanity is something that can be meaningful. 
Humanity is a collection of individuals. It is a group – one that was formed 
through biological processes.  
Philosophers have approached the obscure question “What is the meaning of 
life?” in two primary ways. First, they have sought to distinguish between 
different meanings of “meaning.”43 Second, following Kurt Baier,44 they have 
distinguished between the life of an individual person and human life in general, 
and then have argued that an individual’s life can be meaningful, even if life in 
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41 For a discussion of the ontological status of groups, see Sheehy (2006). He advocates a realist view 
about groups, arguing that they are material particulars and count as objects in the social world.   
42 For an in-depth discussion of the individualism-holism debate, see Zahle and Collin (2014).  
43 See, for example, Nozick (1981), pp. 574-575.  
44 Baier (2000), pp. 101- 132. 
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general is not meaningful or the question about meaning of life is nonsensical. 
Although this approach has resulted in progress in explaining what gives 
meaning to a person’s life, it has left the questions about meaning of life 
unaddressed from the perspective of naturalism.  
I will take a different approach to the question about meaning of life. I will 
seek to clarify what is meant by “humanity.” Humanity can be conceived in two 
different ways. First, humanity can be thought of as a singular group, where the 
focus is on the group, as a whole, rather than the individual members of the 
group. Alternatively, humanity can be conceived as the individual members that 
comprise the group. These two different ways of thinking about humanity give 
rise to the following two different accounts of how humanity could be 
meaningful: 
 
Meaning of Life - Holism: A meaning of life is a meaning possessed or 
accrued by humanity, as a group, and is irreducible to the meaning that 
the members of humanity might accrue in their individual lives.   
 
Meaning of Life - Individualism: A meaning of life is a meaning accrued 
by humanity, through the actions of its individual members, rather than 
through humanity, as a group, and is equal to the sum of the meaning in 
the lives of the individual members of humanity.  
 
Holism about meaning of life is unclear and generates many difficult 
questions, including: If meaning is possessed by the group, rather than earned, 
how did the group come to possess the meaning? Was the meaning bestowed on 
the group from a supernatural or other entity? Alternatively, is this a meaning 
that the group is born with? If the meaning is not possessed by the group, but is 
something that the group can accrue, how does the group do this? Can humanity, 
as a whole, think, act, or have collective intentions?  If not, then it becomes 
difficult to see how humanity, as a group, can accrue meaning. If humanity can 
somehow accrue meaning, how does this holistic meaning accrued by the group 
relate to the meaning in our individual lives that we can achieve? 
The individualistic account of meaning of life is clearer and more plausible 
than holism. With this “bottom-up” explanation of how humanity could be 
meaningful, individual human beings think, act, and are bearers of meaning. 
Individual human beings accrue meaning in their lives by engaging with 
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inherently valuable goods. If meaning is something that can be aggregated in a 
person’s life, and then compared in a standardized way across individuals, it 
seems plausible that one can aggregate the meaning among all individuals to 
determine the extent to which humanity is meaningful. The following comments 
from Irving Singer exemplify thinking about meaning of life in an 
individualistic way. He indicated: “We therefore need to examine the conditions 
under which human beings, and other organisms, make life meaningful. To the 
extent that life becomes meaningful in this accumulative way, its total meaning 
is increased.”45 He continues: “we may possibly assert that the cosmos acquires 
greater meaning only to the extent that it includes a totality of lives that become 
increasingly meaningful.”46 
As indicated, “humanity” can be conceived as a singular group or as the 
individual members that comprise the group. Most people, I suspect, tend to 
think of “humanity” in the holistic sense – as a singular group. Because 
“humanity” and the “human species” have these two meanings, this can lead us 
astray in our reasoning when we think about whether humanity can be 
meaningful. We ask ourselves, for example, what, if anything, would make 
humanity meaningful. When we think of humanity in the holistic way, it 
becomes difficult to conceive of an answer to this question. For example, as 
noted earlier, Ayer was dismissive of the topic of meaning of life because he 
could not envision how life, in general, could be meaningful.  
Humanity is a collection of human beings. Thus, instead of using the 
ambiguous word “humanity,” we could also use the phrase “all human beings” 
or just “human beings.” When we think about the phrase “human beings,” it 
prompts us to think of humanity, not as a singular group, but as the individual 
members that comprise the group. Thus, this phrase avoids the ambiguity of 
“humanity.” If we then ask ourselves the question “what, if anything, would 
make the lives of human beings meaningful?” the question is no longer unclear 
and we can then begin to see possible ways in which the question could be given 
an answer.   
It is often assumed that the questions about meaning in life are distinct from 
questions about meaning of life.47 With the holistic account of meaning of life, 
                                                     
45 Singer (1996), p. 42.     
46 Ibid., p. 44. I would put it differently and say that “human life acquires greater meaning as our 
individual lives become more meaningful.” See also his comments on pp. 117-118.  
47 See, for example, May (2015), pp. 1-2, 24.   
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these questions would perhaps be distinct (under some scenarios). However, 
from the perspective of individualism, the questions about meaning in life are 
directly related to the questions about meaning of life. Indeed, from this 
perspective, objectivist theories of meaning in life can be thought of as a 
proposed explanation not only for how an individual person can accrue meaning 
in his or her life, but also for how humanity can become meaningful. In the 
remainder of the paper, when I use the terms “humanity” or “meaning of life,” I 
will be thinking of them in the individualistic sense.  
One might object to the individualistic account of meaning of life by 
denying that the individual meaning in our lives can be aggregated. Most 
philosophers writing about meaning in life believe that meaning comes in 
degrees. Metz,48 for example, contends that pleasure and meaning can be 
aggregated in a person’s life and then compared to the lives of other people. As 
an example of such a comparison, he writes: “For all I know, my life is, so far, 
more pleasurable than Emily Dickinson’s was, but less meaningful than Albert 
Einstein’s.”49 
Peter Baumann50 contends that there is too much indeterminacy for one to 
make precise interpersonal comparisons of meaning. In response, Metz 
acknowledges that it would be difficult in practice to rank individuals and make 
exact interpersonal comparisons. However, he argues that in principle it would 
be possible to compare the meaning among individuals. In the context of his 
fundamentality theory, one could, for example, assess the degree to which a 
person exercised his or her intelligence. In addition, one could assess how much 
the person’s intelligence was positively oriented toward fundamental conditions 
of human life and how useful the person’s actions were.51 If Metz is correct that 
meaning can be aggregated and compared interpersonally, then there does not 
seem to be a reason why we cannot aggregate the meaning among all human 
beings to determine the extent to which human life is meaningful.     
If there are no objective values, as subjectivists believe, then this would 
undermine the individualistic account of meaning of life that I have outlined. 
With subjective theories of meaning, what makes one’s life meaningful depends 
solely on a subject fulfilling his or her propositional attitudes, such as desires or 
                                                     
48 Metz (2013), p. 63. 
49 Ibid., p. 63. 
50 Baumann (2015).  
51 Metz (2015), p. 246.  
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goals. Because some people have lofty goals and other people have easy to reach 
goals, it would be difficult to make useful comparisons among different 
populations.  
Masahiro Morioka, in reply to Metz, denies that meaning can be compared 
among individuals.52 He proposes a self-evaluation of meaning that he calls “the 
heart of meaning in life.” Morioka contends that the only person who can 
answer the question “does my life like this have any meaning at all?” is the 
person who asks the question.53 In my early writings, I expressed doubt about 
objective values.54 However, in recent years, I have been persuaded by the 
arguments of objectivists. I believe that a person could be mistaken about 
whether his or her life has meaning in it. For example, a person might be 
unaware of the positive impact that he or she has had on the lives of other people. 
If this person were to conclude that his or her life has no meaning at all, then this 
judgement seems to be mistaken.  
 
5. Confronting the Perceived Threat to Meaningfulness 
 
Some philosophers contend that the fleeting nature of life is a threat to the 
meaning in our lives. In an interesting thought experiment, Samuel Scheffler 
asks you to suppose that you will have a normal life span, but that the earth will 
be destroyed from an asteroid strike 30 days after you die. “How would this 
knowledge affect your attitudes during the remainder of your life?” he asks.55 
He argues that “if we lost confidence in the existence of the afterlife [by which 
he means future generations], then many of the things that now matter to us 
would come to matter to us less, in the sense that we would see less reason to 
engage with them . . . and would be less convinced of their value or worth.”56 
In response to Scheffler’s claim, Antti Kauppinen considers the question of 
whether the value of many of our projects depends on the infinite continuation 
of humanity. Kauppinen introduces the notion of a “meaning horizon,”57 which 
is the idea that there is a point at which the existence of future generations no 
                                                     
52 Morioka (2015b).  
53 Ibid., p. 55.  
54 Trisel (2002) and (2004), pp. 378-379. 
55 Scheffler (2013), p. 18.  
56 Ibid., p. 51. For follow-up discussion, see the commentary by other philosophers in Scheffler 
(2013) and Kauppinen (2014).  
57 Kauppinen (2014), p. 3.  
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longer affects the significance of our present activities. For example, for one’s 
current activity to have worth, one might need humanity to survive for 100 years. 
However, outside of this meaning horizon, the worth of this activity may no 
longer depend on humanity surviving beyond this point. Thus, Kauppinen 
concludes that humanity does not need to flourish forever for our lives to 
flourish. 
Scheffler does not argue that humanity must persist forever for our lives to 
be meaningful, but some theists and pessimists have made this argument. As I 
argued in earlier papers, these individuals use unreasonable standards to judge 
whether our lives are meaningful.58 Along these same lines, Iddo Landau 
delinks standards from perspectives and argues that we need not adopt an overly 
demanding standard when viewing life from an external perspective.59 By 
adopting a less demanding standard, one’s life can be meaningful even when 
viewed sub specie aeternitatis. 
Because some people have the desire for our lives and works to last forever, 
the above three approaches are unlikely to persuade them that our lives can be 
“truly” or “ultimately” meaningful. In this section, I will seek to alleviate the 
threat of meaninglessness using a new approach. It will be useful for us to step 
back and ask ourselves the following question. Is it important that our works last 
forever? If there is no need for our works to last forever, as I will argue, then it is 
inappropriate to include the condition of everlastingness as part of a standard for 
judging whether our lives are meaningful.   
Many of us seek to make a lasting contribution, but a contribution to what, 
we should ask. Some people pursue their work to better the lives of non-human 
animals. However, the majority of us pursue our work to better our own lives 
and the lives of other human beings. Thus, the astronomer, for example, seeks to 
make a lasting contribution to human beings’ understanding of the universe. 
Because we pursue our work for the benefit of human beings, it is unnecessary 
for our works to last forever. After humanity goes extinct, our works are no 
longer needed. They would have served their purpose.     
Ronald Dworkin outlines two contrasting models of value – the model of 
impact and the model of challenge.60 The model of impact holds that the value 
of a life consists in its consequences for the rest of the world. By having an 
                                                     
58 Trisel (2002) and (2004). 
59 Landau (2011). For follow-up discussion to this article, see Seachris (2013) and Landau (2014). 
60 Dworkin (2000), pp. 251-253. The model of challenge will not be discussed here.  
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impact on the “world,” it is clear that Dworkin means having an impact on 
human beings.61 
Seachris indicates that if we take the model of impact as the primary metric 
for how to measure the good life, then “futility looms . . . as nothing we do will 
make an impact in any sort of deep, lasting, or ultimate sense in the universe as 
posited by naturalism. Even seemingly great impacts, like finding a cure for 
cancer, end up not mattering . . . .”62 Is this correct? Suppose that humanity will 
exist for another 100,000 years. If a scientist discovers a cure for cancer within 
the next year, but then immediately loses this research, this would be tragic. It 
would be tragic because people would continue to suffer from cancer for 
100,000 years, assuming that no one else subsequently discovers a cure for 
cancer. But it would not be tragic if the research of this scientist is lost at the 
time humanity goes extinct. The research by the scientist made a great impact, in 
terms of improving the lives of human beings, for as long as it was needed. Thus, 
by clarifying the purpose for which the scientist pursues his or her work (i.e., to 
benefit humanity), it then becomes clear that there is no need for the research to 
last forever.  
In response, one might argue that people create their works not just to create 
something of instrumental value to humanity or non-human animals, but also to 
create something of intrinsic value. Thus, one might concede that it does not 
matter whether something of instrumental value lasts forever, but then argue that 
it does matter how long something of intrinsic value endures. In reflecting on 
whether it matters how long humanity will persist, James Lenman considers the 
idea that human beings and our works have intrinsic value and that, if true, this 
might provide grounds for arguing that humanity should continue to exist for as 
long as possible. But after considering this argument, he rejects it. He writes: “It 
may be intrinsically good that great works of music or literature should exist. 
But it is by no means obvious that these works contribute more value by being 
longer.”63 Thus, one who believes that our lives are ultimately meaningless 
unless our works last forever will need to explain how these works contribute 
more value by lasting longer. 
 
                                                     
61 See also Singer (1995), pp. 230-231. By improving the “world,” he means improving the lives of 
human beings and non-human animals.  
62 Seachris (2011), p. 151.  
63 Lenman (2002), p. 255, emphasis in original.  
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6. Preventing Futility and Attaining Narrative Closure 
 
In section four, I argued that humanity could become meaningful through the 
actions of its individual members. By engaging, in a passionate way, with 
inherently valuable and natural goods, it adds meaning to our individual lives, 
which, in turn, adds meaning to humanity. In this section, I will explain narrative 
closure and will argue that providing closure to the naturalistic meta-narrative 
would also enhance the meaning of life.  
What is narrative closure? Is closure necessary for a good ending? Noël 
Carroll distinguishes narrative closure from other types of closure. A logical 
argument or the finale of a symphony can provide closure, but these types of 
closure differ from narrative closure, Carroll 64  argues. Narrative closure 
provides a sense that the central questions posed by the narrative have been 
“wrapped up” and that the ending is occurring not too soon or too late, but at 
just the right time. Some types of narrative do not provide closure, as Seachris 
acknowledges.65 For example, as Carroll66 points out, soap operas and narrative 
histories of nations have large and expanding middle sections, but they lack 
closure. 
Narrative closure is an ambiguous notion, as Kathy Behrendt67 indicates. 
Behrendt, in the context of discussing whether closure affects the meaning in a 
person’s life, points out that scholars have conceived of narrative closure in two 
different ways – what she refers to as “weak” and “strong” closure.68 Weak 
closure is thought of as having a meaning-enhancing role in which the end of 
one’s life can elevate one’s entire life story. With strong closure, the “last 
chapter” is viewed as the key to unifying the events into a meaningful whole. By 
transforming a life from lost opportunities into one with meaning, the “end can 
provide meaning that the life would otherwise lack altogether . . . .”69 Thus, 
attaining strong closure is thought of as having a sort of retroactive power to 
give meaning to a person’s life. In what follows, I will be conceiving of closure 
in the “weak” sense as I explain how attaining this type of closure can enhance 
the meaning of humanity.  
                                                     
64 Carroll (2007), pp. 1-2. 
65 Seachris (2011), p. 149. 
66 Carroll (2007), p. 2. 
67 Behrendt (2014), p. 336. 
68 Ibid., pp. 336-338. 
69 Ibid., p. 336. 
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As you recall, Seachris suggests that the naturalistic meta-narrative lacks 
closure. There is a discrepancy, he contends, between our “deepest desires” and 
what is attainable in the universe. These deepest desires include, for example, 
the desire for personal immortality and for our works to endure. It is this 
discrepancy, he argues, that explains why some people think that our efforts are 
ultimately futile.  
Supernaturalist theories of meaning reflect the desire for perfection, as Metz 
has convincingly argued.70 Stewart Goetz explicitly asserts that the meaning of 
human life is to achieve “perfect happiness,” which is “the unending experience 
of nothing but pleasure . . . .”71 If these “deepest desires,” which Seachris 
discusses, were unattainable and ineradicable, then many of our efforts would 
be ultimately futile. However, we are not stuck with these desires for perfection. 
These desires are not inborn. They are acquired and nothing is forcing us to 
retain these desires. Letting go of these unattainable desires would prevent this 
so-called “cosmic futility” and provide narrative closure.72  
In earlier articles, I proposed the preceding approach as a way to prevent 
one’s efforts from being futile.73 In response, Seachris argues that because 
human beings assign significance to narrative endings, this will likely make it 
difficult for many people to adopt this approach.74 That it is “difficult” to 
relinquish these unattainable desires should not deter us from doing so. It is also 
difficult to forgive someone who has wronged us. Despite being difficult, many 
people come to realize that forgiving someone has many benefits including that 
it helps relieve anger, resentment, and anguish. As with forgiving, accepting the 
limitations of our existence is difficult, but it is a path to freeing ourselves from 
anguish and for attaining narrative closure. 
Many people bemoan human limitations, but they fail to recognize that 
without these limits, there would be no transcending of limits, and less 
opportunity for us to add meaning to life.75 The moonwalk was meaningful, in 
                                                     
70 Metz (2009), pp. 192-194 and (2013), pp. 132-133, 137-138. 
71 Goetz (2012), p. 29. 
72 Buddhists advocate a similar approach for alleviating human suffering and dissatisfaction. They 
believe that this approach of extinguishing desires can lead to nirvana. Collins (2010, p. 121) argues 
that nirvana “brings closure to individual lives in a master-text that itself can have no final ending.”   
73 Trisel (2002) and (2004).  
74 Seachris (2011), p. 157. 
75 There has recently been some debate, from a secular perspective, about whether evil is sometimes 
necessary to enable or produce good. Tabensky (2009, p. 58), who is a proponent of this idea, makes a 
similar point to the one I make when he argues that to overcome an obstacle, it is first necessary to 
have an obstacle in place.  
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large part, because it was difficult and involved transcending a limit. If we had 
been born with the capability to jump to the moon, we could walk on the moon 
whenever we wanted, but doing so would not be a meaning-enhancing 
achievement.    
To give a second example, if human beings were all-knowing, instead of 
having limited knowledge, where would that leave scientists who thrive on 
making discoveries and acquiring knowledge? Albert Einstein, for example, led 
a meaningful life by making important discoveries. What would his life have 
been like if there was nothing left to discover? 
When we scrutinize our ideals, they frequently turn out to be less ideal than 
we first imagined. For example, in commenting on the ideal of Heaven, Colleen 
McDannell and Bernhard Lang write: “Scientific, philosophical, and theological 
skepticism has nullified the modern heaven and replaced it with teachings that 
are minimalist, meager, and dry.”76 The insight that comes from scrutinizing our 
ideals helps pave the way for being able to relinquish unattainable desires. In 
recognizing that the ideal falls short of what was promised, it also fosters an 
appreciation for our imperfect lives.  
Bertrand Russell, in the following well-known passage, imagined that 
humanity would end in the following way: 
 
[A]ll the labors of the ages . . . are destined to extinction . . . and . . . the 
whole temple of man’s achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the 
debris of a universe in ruins . . . are yet so nearly certain that no 
philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within . . . these 
truths, only in the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s 
habitation henceforth be safely built.77  
 
In this passage, Russell mentions that human beings made some 
achievements, but there is no culminating achievement, such as one where we 
discover how life originated. Such an achievement would further enhance the 
meaning of life. Even if we imagine that human beings did make such an 
achievement, Russell’s envisioned ending is still missing something important, 
that of attaining narrative closure. Consequently, the ending is not as meaningful 
or satisfying as it could be. The conflicts that humanity struggled with from the 
                                                     
76 McDannell and Lang (1988), p. 352. 
77 Russell (2000), p. 72.   
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beginning remain unresolved at the end. It is my hope for humanity that our 
ending will be as follows.  
 
Human beings overcame many obstacles and persisted for a long time 
before perishing through no fault of their own. They made many great 
achievements, including discovering how life originated and formulating a 
“Theory of Everything.” They knew that their works would be lost when 
humanity became extinct, but this did not matter because these works 
were created to benefit human beings and they had served their purpose. 
From the beginning, human beings struggled with their finitude and other 
limitations, but using their rationality, they eventually came to appreciate 
and accept these limitations. 
 
Such an ending to humanity is one that would be worthy of pride.78 The 
“last word” with this ending is not death and complete dissolution. Rather, the 
last word is our acceptance of our finitude and other limitations. It would be 
extremely difficult for any species to overcome a situation in which they were 
born into a world in which some of their “deepest desires” were unrealizable. If, 
as envisioned in the above ending, human beings are able to resolve these 
challenging conflicts, this also could be thought of as a type of culminating 
achievement. By learning from our past struggles, and using our rationality to 
come to terms with our finitude and other limitations, it would provide narrative 
closure and enhance the meaning of human life. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
Conceiving of naturalism in a narrative way prompts us to think about what 
would make for a good ending to humanity, which, in turn, prompts us to think 
about what matters in life and how we should live our lives in order to achieve a 
meaningful ending. Although it is inevitable that humanity will end, it is not 
inevitable that we will end badly. Humanity could end in a good and meaningful 
way, as I have attempted to demonstrate.  
                                                     
78 I am not suggesting that this is the only ending that would add meaning to human life. There might 
be alternative endings that would do the same. Despite whether everyone agrees that a particular 
ending would be meaningful, it could still be meaningful. Under a pure objective theory of meaning, if 
something is meaningful, then it is meaningful regardless of what we think or feel about it.  
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I have assumed, as Seachris has argued, that naturalism is a meta-narrative. 
If naturalism is not a meta-narrative, then it probably would not make sense to 
talk about humanity as having a “good” or “bad” ending. Nonetheless, humanity 
could be meaningful regardless of whether naturalism is a meta-narrative. It is 
doubtful that there is a “meaning of life,” in the sense that humanity was created 
for a purpose by a deity,79 but humanity could become meaningful in a different 
way: from the moral, intellectual, and artistic efforts and achievements of its 
individual members. 
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